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Abstract
This paper tries to challenge two puzzles in the welfare benefit program. The first puzzle
is ‘non-take-up welfare’ which means poor people do not take-up welfare even though
they are approved to take-up. Second, empirical evidence suggests that there may ex-
ist the inverse U-shaped relationship between benefit level and beneficiary ratio. We
present a model of welfare stigma as a hypothesis to explain the above puzzles. Specifi-
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1 Introduction
To analyze welfare programs, most public economics researchers exploit a labor supply model
that is based on the maximization problem of leisure and consumption goods. This model
can explain ‘welfare fraud’ but not ‘non-take-up of welfare’: welfare fraud means households
take-up even though they are non-eligible; non-take-up welfare signifies that needy poor
people do not take-up welfare even though they are approved to take-up. However, ‘non-
take-up’ occurs in most developed countries (Currie, 2006; Immervoll, 2009; Plueger, 2009).
Moreover, the result in comparative statics in the standard model, an increase in the level of
welfare benefit has a disincentive effect on labour supply and the number of welfare benefit
increases. Our empirical evidence, which is described later, nevertheless highlights the ratio
of recipients to population decreases in benefit level when the level is sufficiently high.
That is to say; there exist some factors that are not considered in the standard model. One
such factor is stigma, a sociological concept describing a negative label applied to behavior by
society or a social group. In particular, stigma is an important concept in social psychology
(Major et al., 2018).
Moffitt (1983) conducted one of the earlier studies to focus on welfare stigma in economics
by analyzing household decision-making regarding whether to take up welfare benefits or
supply labor by including the stigma as a kind of monetary cost. Moreover, that paper
empirically examined theoretical results using panel study of income dynamics (PSID). Con-
sequently, that author suggested that fixed stigma is statistically significant, but that variable
stigma with respect to benefit level is not.
Besley and Coates (1992) pioneering research analyzed situations wherein stigmas were
endogenized. They presented two models of social stigma: statistical discrimination and
taxpayer resentment. Their results indicated the occurrence of welfare fraud. As needy types
usually chose to take-up welfare benefits, non-take-up of welfare benefits did not manifest in
their model. However, take-up rate in the United Kingdom was approximately 80 % (Duclos,
1995), approximately 60-67 % in the United States (Blank and Ruggles, 1996), approximately
1
37 % in Germany (Riphahn, 2001) and 16.3-19.7 % in Japan (Tachibanaki and Urakawa,
2006). Blumkin et al. (2015) analyzed welfare stigma as a policy tool, which was used to
restrain welfare fraud. Thus, non-take-up welfare did not manifest in their model1.
This study extends the model of Besley and Coate (1992) to explain the occurrence of
non-take-up of welfare benefits. Unlike Besley and Coate (1992), we endogenize decision-
making for needy poor people. Our comparative analysis indicates that an increase in the
benefit level makes non-take-up of welfare benefits more serious.
The structure of this paper is as follows; the next section shows some empirical evidence
regarding the relationship the between benefit level and the recipient ratio. The third section
presents the model and the basic setting. The forth section conducts comparative static
analysis. The final section concludes this paper.
2 Some Empirical Evidence
This section presents empirical evidence to explore the relationship between the recipient
ratio and the minimum income benefit level using the OECD panel data.
2.1 Econometric Model
The panel data were analyzed to investigate the correlation between the minimum guaran-
teed income level and social benefit recipients. The decision to employ the panel data to
investigate the relationship reflects three motivations. First, a panel data model can have
better prediction accuracy than the cross-sectional model and time-series model because it
has more observations than cross-section data and time-series data. Second, it enables re-
searchers to address the issue of endogeneity caused by omitted variable bias. Third, it allows
us to include changes in society in the empirical analysis (Greene, 2012). This paper analyzes
the relationship between the minimum income benefit level and social benefit recipient ratio
1 Hupkau and Maniquet (2018) analyzed the problem of non-take-up of welfare from the perspective of
identity economics (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Kranton, 2016)
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based on the baseline model:
yit = x
′
itβ + eit, (1)
where yit is the dependent variable, x
′
it is the K-dimensional vector of predictors consisting of
the target explanatory variable and the covariates, β is the K-dimensional vector of unknown
parameters, and eit is the disturbance term, which is distributed as eit ∼ N (0, σ
2
e). Further-
more, in equation (1), i = 1, . . . n indicates the index for a country, whereas t = 1, . . . , T
represents the index for time. The OLS estimation of equation (1) after pooling the available
data is called the pooling estimation.
When we consider the country-specific heterogeneity in the disturbance term of equation
(1), eit can be decomposed as follows:
yit = x
′
itβ + eit
eit = αi + νit, (2)
where αi is the error depending on the country i and νit ∼ i.i.d. N (0, σ
2
ν) is the stochastic
disturbance term. Equation (2) can be considered a one-way error component model (Baltagi,
1984) because it decomposes the disturbance term eit into the error based on the individual
heterogeneity and the stochastic error. The model in equation (2) can be estimated using
a one-way fixed-effect estimator (hereinafter, one-way FE) and the one-way random-effect
estimator (hereinafter, one-way RE). The one-way FE presumes the binary dummy variable
for αi whereas the one-way RE assumes that the individual effect is randomly determined.
Considering the heterogeneity caused by the individual effect as in equation (1), the
disturbance term can be further decomposed to incorporate heterogeneity in time:
yit = x
′
itβ + eit
eit = αi + λt + νit, (3)
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where λt is the error depending on the time t. Equation (3), a two-way error component model
(Baltagi, 1984), decomposes the disturbance term into the error based on the heterogeneity
of country i, the error caused by the time such as economic shocks, and the stochastic
disturbance. As with equation (2),the model of equation (3) can be estimated by a two-
way fixed-effect estimator (hereinafter, two-way FE) and a two-way random-effect estimator
(hereinafter, two-way RE).
This paper estimates the relationship between the minimum income benefit level and
social benefit recipients using five estimation methods: pooling, one-way FE, one-way RE,
two-way FE, and two-way RE. These estimation methods are assessed via hypothesis testing.
We first implement the F -test for pooling versus one-way FE or two-way FE. Second, we
perform the Lagrange multiplier test (hereinafter, LM -test) (Honda, 1985) for pooling versus
one-way RE or two-way RE. Finally, we conduct a Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) for one-
way RE versus one-way FE, two-way RE, and two-way FE. Further information on hypothesis
testing in the panel data analysis has been given by Baltagi (2008).
2.2 Data
This section proposes the detail of our dataset used for estimation of the panel data models
introduced in Section 2.1. All of the data described below were obtained from OECD.Stat
(OECD, 2019).
For the dependent variable, we use the logit-transformed version (logit recipients ratio)
of the recipients ratio (recipient ratio), which is the ratio of social benefit recipients to
the total population. Data on the number of social benefit recipients were retrieved from the
Social Benefit Recipients Database, and total population data were obtained from Population
Statistics.
For the target explanatory variable, we include the minimum guaranteed income mgincome,
which represents the degree of social benefits in terms of the ratio of the per capita social
benefits to the median per capita income. These data can be retrieved from the Adequacy
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of Guaranteed Minimum Income Benefits. Furthermore, we incorporate the quadratic term
mgincome (mgincome 2) to consider the nonlinear effect of the target explanatory variable.
In order to account for any estimation biases caused by unobserved confounders, we
additionally incorporate the following covariates into the vector of predictors:
• log gdp capita: the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (gdp capita), retrieved
from Annual National Accounts.
• youth dependency: ratio of young population (0 to 14 years old) to productive popu-
lation (15 to 64), retrieved from Population Statistics.
• old dependency: ratio of old population (over 65 years old) to productive population
(15 to 64), retrieved from Population Statistics.
• divorce rate: the marriage divorce rate, retrieved from Family Database.
• unemployment: the national unemployment rate for working-age population, retrieved
from Labor Force Statistics.
The panel dataset using a date on the aforementioned variables. After reducing some
missing series in the sample that was not randomly missing, we obtain panel data on n = 25
countries covering the time frame 2007 to 2012. This paper conducts the empirical analysis
using the panel data with the number of observation nT = N = 150.
2.3 Result
This section presents the result of the empirical analysis investigating the relationship be-
tween the minimum guaranteed income level on the ratio of the number of recipients.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of pooled panel data. This table demonstrates
the large inequality between the minimum and maximum recipient ratio (minimum: 0.001,
maximum: 0.037). Furthermore, the maximum of mgincome in Table 1 indicates that coun-
tries tend to guarantee almost 60% of the median per capita income through its social benefit
programme, although the median and mean of the guaranteed minimum income is about 40%.
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Examining the descriptive statistics by country, Table 2 indicates the necessity of adjust-
ment by covariates or dealing with country-based heterogeneity when we assume that the
minimum income benefit level is the determinant factor influencing benefit recipients/ total
population ratio. For example, Canada and the Slovak Republic have the same maximum
mean of recipient rate (0.034); however, their mean minimum guaranteed income level differs
(Canada: 0.368, Slovak Republic: 0.238).
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics by year. Although no large difference in means
and medians can be found in this table, the standard deviation of the minimum guaranteed
income level has a relatively large outlier in 2012 (0.89). This motivates us to include time-
specific heterogeneity into our model by estimating the two-way error component model.
Before proceeding to regression analysis, let us discuss the simple correlation between
benefit level and recipient ratio. Figure 1 presents the scatter plot of the observed couples
(mgincome, recipient ratio). Even though the figure depicts the roughly convex relation-
ship of two variables in interest, possible confounders might lead to a spurious correlation
among them. We thus discuss a regression analysis taking into account other factors, which
may affect both of these target variables, and unobserved heterogeneity pertaining to country-
specific factors and time-specific factors.
As the main findings in this empirical evidence, Table 4 shows the estimation results of
panel data regression models based on the data introduced in Section 2.2. Each row corre-
sponds to an explanatory variable, and each column corresponds to an estimation method.
The standard errors of the estimated coefficients are estimated using the heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent estimator (hereinafter HAC estimator) of Arellano (1987).
The bottom part of this table gives the results of the hypothesis testing carried out for model
evaluation.
Regarding the hypothesis testing concerning the pooling estimation, both one-way FE and
two-way FE are accepted at 1% statistical significance according to the F -test results. LM -
tests for the random-effect estimators reject the pooling estimation at 1% significance but
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accept the one-way RE and two-way RE at the same level of significance. In the comparison
of fixed-effect estimators and random-effect estimators, Hausman tests do not reject either
one-way RE or two-way RE. Furthermore, neither of the fixed-effect estimators are accepted.
Looking at the estimated coefficients by pooling estimation, mgincome has a significantly
positive effect on the recipient ratio, and its quadratic term has a significantly negative effect
on the recipient ratio. This suggests that the minimum guaranteed income level has an upper
convex effect on recipient/population ratio. However, the results of F -test, which compares
the pooling estimation with the fixed-effect estimators, and of the LM -test, which compares
the pooling estimation with the random-effect estimators, highlight the necessity to take
heterogeneity in a country or in both a country and time into account.
The Hausman test results in Table 4 suggest that the correlation between the explanatory
variables and country effect or between the explanatory variables and both country effect and
time effect is not statistically significant, i.e., the correlation between xit and αi or xit and
both αi and λt is not statistically significant. Therefore, the random-effect estimator, which
assumes no correlation between the explanatory variables and decomposed effects such as
αi and λt, is the most preferable method according to the hypothesis test results. In the
estimation result of one-way RE considering country-specific heterogeneity, the minimum
guaranteed income level has an upper convex effect on recipient/population ratio as well as
the pooling estimation. This relationship is similar to the one found in the estimation of the
two-way error component models.
Figure 2 presents the fitted curve of one-way RE with the scatter plot of the couples
of observations (mgincome, logit recipient ratio). As we discussed, the one-way RE
curve indeed visually indicates the upper convex relationship between the benefit level and
the beneficiary ratio. Moreover, the figure gives two categories and members defined by
an estimated maximum value of recipient ratio. For example, group 2, whose members
have more mgincome than the benefit level corresponding to an estimated maximum of
logit recipient ratio, includes Netherlands, Denmark and Germany.
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The empirical results presented in this section have demonstrated the existence of an
upper convex relation between the benefit level and the recipient ratio.
3 Model
In this section, we present a model of welfare stigma to explain ‘non-take-up’.
3.1 The basic setting
There are two types in the economy. A ‘needy type’ is an individual who cannot work and a
‘non-needy type’ is defined as an individual who can work if he or she hopes so. We assume
that a proportion of needy types in the total population is γ ∈ (0, 1). In the economy, needy
types are eligible for welfare benefits, and non-needy types are not. That is, it is called ‘non-
take-up welfare’ that the needy type does not take-up welfare benefit and ‘welfare fraud’ that
the non-needy type take-up welfare benefit. To make the notation clear, we denote the needy
type as ‘type 1’ and the non-needy as ‘type 2’. Type 1 individuals have two choices; take-up
welfare or not. The utility setting is,


u (b, z1)− φ1s (p, q, z1) if taking up welfare,
0 otherwise,
where s is an index of stigma cost, which is explained later, p is a proportion of recipients to
sub-population in type 1, q is a proportion of recipients to sub-population in type 2 and φiis
the sensitivity to stigma which varies over type i’s sub-population, φiU˜ [0, φ], φi and φj are
i.i.d, i, j = 1, 2, ij. u(·, ·) denotes a material utility, zi is type i’s capability of consumption,
i = 1, 2. b is a level of welfare benefit. We assume the following properties, ∀zi, i = 1, 2, an
income I ∈ w, b2
2For simplicity, we assume the price of consumption good is 1.
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∂u(I,zi)
∂I
> 0,
∂u(I,zi)
∂zi
> 0,
∂u(I,zi)
∂I∂zi
≥ 0.
The third property means that capability and consumption are complementary.
Type 2 individuals have two choices to either accept welfare benefits or work. Type 2’s
utility setting is as follows:


u (b, z2)− φ2s (p, q, z2) if taking up welfare,
u (w, z2)− θ if working.
Here θ is disutility of labor, and w is work income. We assume z2 > z1, that is to say,
type 2’s capability is higher than that of type 1 individuals cannot work because of time
constraints, physical disabilities or mental illness. These constraints can affect consumption.
For example, it makes sense that a single-parent household with limited free time will not
enjoy consumption from income I less than a parent’s household.
3.2 The critical level of sensitivity to stigma
To understand a household’s decision-making, we consider the critical sensitivity of stigma
cost, φi, as follows:
u (b, z1)− φˆ1s (p, q, z1) = 0,
u (b, z2)− φˆ2s (p, q; z2) = u (w, z2)− θ.
A type 1 household, where φ1 is less than or equal to φˆ1 prefers to take-up welfare. Then,
all households in which φ1 ∈
[
0, φˆ1
]
choose to take-up welfare and all households in which
φ1 ∈
(
φˆ1, φ
]
do not. Similarly, type 2 households in which φ2 is less than or equal to φˆ2
prefer to take-up welfare. All households in which φ2 ∈
[
0, φˆ2
]
choose to take-up welfare On
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the other hand, all households in which φ1 ∈
(
φˆ1, φ
]
choose to work.
The proportion of recipients in type 1, p, is as follows:
p = min
{
φˆ1
φ
, 1
}
= min
{
u (b, z1)
φs (p, q, z1)
, 1
}
.
And the proportion of recipients in type 2, q, is as follows:
q = min
{
φˆ2
φ
, 1
}
= min
{
u (b, z2)− u (w, z2) + θ
φs (p, q, z2)
, 1
}
.
3.3 Formulation of the stigma cost function
In this section, we formulate the stigma cost function. The probability that the recipients
are non-needy is given by the following:
Pr(i = 2|Take-up welfare) =
(1− γ)q
γp+ (1− γ)q
:= Π.
We assume that stigma cost is an increasing function with pi as follows:
s = s (Π(p, q), zi) ,
∂s (Π(p, q), zi)
∂Π
> 0, for i = 1, 2.
This formulation is inspired by the statistical stigma in Besley and Coate (1992) and Blumkin
et al. (2015). Setting a stigma means as follows. People in society despise ‘welfare fraud’
(the taking-up welfare by non-needy type (type 2)). However, without distinguishing between
type 1 and 2, it is difficult to know whether welfare fraud is actually being committed.
Stigma cost is a function of capability. While Besley and Coate (1992) assumed that
stigma cost was the same for all recipients, we differentiate stigma cost by the capabilities of
type 1 and 2. Even though, we do not assume the sign of ∂s (Π, zi) /∂zi. We denote pi as the
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ratio p/q, then,
Π =
1
γp/(1− γ)q + 1
=
1
γ/(1− γ)pi + 1
.
I can rewrite this as follows:
s = s (Π(p, q), zi) = s (Π(p/q, 1), zi) := s (pi, zi) .
Clearly, we obtain the following:
∂s (Π, zi)
∂Π
∂Π
∂pi
< 0.
An equilibrium point corresponds to a solution in the following simultaneous equation:


p =
uˆ (b, z1)
φs (pi, z1)
,
q =
uˆ (b, z2)
φs (pi, z2)
,
pi =
p
q
.
Substituting the first and the second row equations into the right hand side of the third row
equation, it indicates
pi =
p(pi)
q(pi)
=
uˆ (b, z1)
uˆ (b, z2)
s (pi, z2)
s (pi, z1)
:= M(pi).
Here,
uˆ (b, z1) ≡ u (b, z1) ,
uˆ (b, z2) ≡ u (b, z2)− u (w, z2) + θ.
uˆ(b, zi) is the incremental material utility when taking-up welfare. M(pi) is a mapping from
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pi to itself. By differentiation, we obtain the following:
dM(pi)
dpi
=
uˆ (b, z1)
uˆ (b, z2)
[
∂s (pi, z2) /∂pi
s (pi, z1)
−
s (pi, z2)
s (pi, z1)
2
∂s (pi, z1)
∂pi
]
=
uˆ (b, z1)
uˆ (b, z2)
s (pi, z2)
s (pi, z1)
[
∂s (pi, z2) /∂pi
s (pi, z2)
−
∂s (pi, z1) /∂pi
s (pi, z1)
]
=
∂s (pi, z2)
∂pi
pi
s (pi, z2)
−
∂s (pi, z1)
∂pi
pi
s (pi, z1)
.
Here, we define the elasticity of stigma cost to pi:
εpi (zi) ≡ −
∂s (pi, zi)
∂pi
pi
s (pi, zi)
.
Using this elasticity, we rewrite this as given:
dM(pi)
dpi
= εpi (z1)− εpi (z2) .
Equation 3.3 corresponds to a slope of M(pi), which is a change of ratio to itself. Then, if
εpi (z1) − εpi (z2) in some domain, the possibility of multiple equilibria exists. The stability
condition is
εpi (z1)− εpi (z2) < 1.
4 Comparative statics
In this section, we conduct comparative statics. We are particularly interested in how a
change in benefit level to equilibrium and we compare our empirical evidence and theoretical
results.
We define the elasticity as follows:
ηb (zi) ≡
∂uˆ (b, zi)
∂b
b
uˆ (b, zi)
.
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This is an elasticity of material utility to benefit level. The result is summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1
sgn
[
dp∗
db
]
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
−
εpi∗ (z1)
1 + εpi∗ (z2)
]
,
sgn
[
dq∗
db
]
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
−
1 + εpi∗ (z1)
εpi∗ (z2)
]
,
sgn
[
dpi∗
db
]
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
− 1
]
.
Proof. See appendix.
When the ratio, ηb(z1)/ηb(z2), is sufficiently low, the equilibrium proportion of recipient
in the needy type, p∗, the equilibrium proportion of recipient in the non-needy type, q∗, and
the ratio of them, pi∗ = p∗/q∗, decrease in the level of welfare benefit.
In the second section, we show some empirical evidence that there exists an upper convex
relation between the benefit level and the recipient ratio. Let denote R as a proportion of
recipients to total population. Since the size of population is normalized to 1, R is given as
follows:
R = γp+ (1− γ)q.
An effect of a change in benefit level on R is:
dR∗
db
= γ
dp∗
db
+ (1− γ)
dq∗
db
.
The sign of dR
∗
db
is:
sgn
dR∗
db
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
−
1− γ + εpi∗ (z1)
γ + εpi∗ (z2)
]
.
The recipient ratio increases in the benefit level when the ratio of elasticity, ηb(z1)/ηb(z2),
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is sufficiently low, vice versa. We present a model as a hypothesis to explain some empirical
evidence; a raise of the benefit level reduces the recipient ratio when the benefit level is
sufficiently high.
5 Conclusion
This paper tried to challenge two puzzles in the welfare benefit program. The first puzzle was
‘non-take-up welfare’ which means poor people do not take-up welfare even though they are
approved to take-up. Second, empirical evidence suggested that there may exist the inverse
U-shaped relationship between benefit level and beneficiary ratio. We presented a model of
welfare stigma as a hypothesis to explain the above puzzles. Specifically, we investigated the
statistical discrimination view model.
When the ratio of elasticity of material utility to benefit level among eligible and non-
eligible type decrease in the benefit level, theoretical results are very consistent with empirical
evidences. We want to present a model that can explain the situation as future work.
In our model, non-eligible types’ decision-makings are extensive. We would like to try to
extend our model to consider both intensive and extensive margin.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Equilibrium equations are as follows:

p =
uˆ (b, z1)
φs (pi, z1)
,
q =
uˆ (b, z2)
φs (pi, z2)
,
pi =
p
q
.
By logarithmic transformation, we obtain the following:

ln p = ln uˆ (b, z1)− ln s (pi, z1)− lnφ,
ln q = ln uˆ (b, z2)− ln s (pi, z2)− lnφ,
ln pi = ln p− ln q.
By totally differentiating and setting dθ = dw = dφ = dz1 = dz2 = dγ = 0,

dp
p
=
∂uˆ (b, z1) /∂b
uˆ (b, z1)
db−
∂s (pi, z1) /∂pi
s (pi, z1)
dpi,
dq
q
=
∂uˆ (b, z2) /∂b
uˆ (b, z2)
db−
∂s (pi, z2) /∂pi
s (pi, z2)
dpi,
dpi
pi
=
dp
p
−
dq
q
.
⇐⇒

dp
p
=
∂aˆ (b, z1)
∂b
b
uˆ (b, z1)
db
b
−
∂s (pi, z1)
∂pi
pi
s (pi, z1)
dpi
pi
,
dq
q
=
∂aˆ (b, z2)
∂b
b
uˆ (b, z2)
db
b
−
∂s (pi, z2)
∂pi
pi
s (pi, z2)
dpi
pi
,
dpi
pi
=
dp
p
−
dq
q
.
⇐⇒

dp
p
= ηb (z1)
db
b
+ εpi (z1)
dpi
pi
,
dq
q
= ηb (z2)
db
b
+ εpi (z2)
dpi
pi
,
dpi
pi
=
dp
p
−
dq
q
.
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A matrix representation is given below:

 1 0 −εpi (z1)0 1 −εpi (z2)
1 −1 −1




dp/p
db/b
dq/q
db/b
dpi/pi
db/b

 =

 ηb (z1)ηb (z2)
0

 .
By Cramer’s rule, solutions are given as follows:
dp/p
db/b
=
−ηb (z1) [1 + εpi (z2)] + ηb (z2) εpi (z1)
εpi (z1)− [1 + εpi (z2)]
,
dq/q
db/b
=
ηb (z2) [1 + εpi (z1)]− ηb (z1) εpi (z2)
εpi (z1)− [1 + εpi (z2)]
,
dpi/pi
db/b
=
−ηb(z1) + ηb(z2)
εpi (z1)− [1 + εpi (z2)]
.
Since the stability condition is εpi∗ (z1)−εpi∗ (z2) < 1, the denominator, εpi(z1)−[1+εpi(z2)],
is negative.
Therefore, the result of comparative statics regarding a change in benefit level is given as
follows:
sgn
[
dp∗
db
]
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
−
εpi∗ (z1)
1 + εpi∗ (z2)
]
,
sgn
[
dq∗
db
]
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
−
1 + εpi∗ (z1)
εpi∗ (z2)
]
,
sgn
[
dpi∗
db
]
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
− 1
]
.
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Figure 1: Simple relationship between beneficiary ratio and benefit level
Notes: Strings accompanied by points indicate ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of countries.
18
AU
AT
AT
AT
BE
CACA
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ DK
DK
EE
EE
EE
EE
EE
FIFI
DE
HUHU
IS IS
IL
LU NL
NL
NZ
NZ
PT
SKSK
SI
ES
SE
−15
−12
−9
−6
−3
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
mgincome
re
ci
pi
en
ts
_r
a
tio
_l
og
it
group
a
a
group_1
group_2
Figure 2: Fitted curve of one-way RE and scatter plot between beneficiary ratio and benefit
level
Notes: Strings accompanied by points indicate ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of countries. The
dashed blue line indicates a location of mgincome which corresponds to an estimated
maximum of recipients ratio logit obtained by the fitted curve of one-way RE.
group 1 and group 2 are defined by the location based on the dashed blue line. If an
observed value of mgincome is less than the dashed blue line, it is categorized as group 1
otherwise it is categorized as group 2.
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Table 1: Descriptive stastistics of OECD panel data: whole data
Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max
recipients ratio 0.016 0.015 0.009 0.001 0.037
logit recipients ratio -4.327 -4.175 0.753 -6.591 -3.268
mgincome 0.397 0.400 0.082 0.230 0.590
mgincome 2 0.164 0.160 0.065 0.053 0.348
gdp capita 37704.939 37699.559 14081.170 16788.433 91814.013
log gdp capita 10.479 10.537 0.335 9.728 11.428
youth dependency 0.254 0.241 0.053 0.199 0.459
old dependency 0.229 0.238 0.040 0.138 0.314
divorce rate 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003
unemployment 0.074 0.072 0.037 0.023 0.249
Notes : T = 6, n = 25, N = 150.
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Table 2: Descriptive stastistics of OECD panel data: by country
country recipients ratio logit recipients ratio mgincome mgincome 2 gdp capita log gdp capita youth dependency old dependency divorce rate unemployment
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Australia 0.013 (0.001) -4.315 (0.074) 0.447 (0.010) 0.200 (0.009) 40852.112 (2156.481) 10.617 (0.053) 0.284 (0.002) 0.201 (0.007) 0.002 (0.000) 0.050 (0.005)
Austria 0.018 (0.002) -4.029 (0.138) 0.430 (0.039) 0.186 (0.035) 42435.028 (2584.710) 10.654 (0.060) 0.222 (0.006) 0.259 (0.005) 0.002 (0.000) 0.048 (0.004)
Belgium 0.009 (0.000) -4.744 (0.035) 0.437 (0.012) 0.191 (0.011) 39517.464 (2220.265) 10.583 (0.056) 0.257 (0.001) 0.261 (0.003) 0.003 (0.000) 0.076 (0.005)
Canada 0.034 (0.002) -3.335 (0.049) 0.368 (0.017) 0.136 (0.013) 40428.026 (1271.527) 10.607 (0.031) 0.239 (0.004) 0.203 (0.008) 0.002 (0.000) 0.073 (0.010)
Czech Republic 0.013 (0.006) -4.592 (0.996) 0.315 (0.032) 0.100 (0.022) 27776.316 (1070.706) 10.231 (0.039) 0.205 (0.006) 0.218 (0.014) 0.003 (0.000) 0.063 (0.011)
Denmark 0.015 (0.002) -4.161 (0.140) 0.575 (0.010) 0.331 (0.012) 42137.252 (2322.734) 10.647 (0.055) 0.276 (0.004) 0.251 (0.014) 0.003 (0.000) 0.061 (0.020)
Estonia 0.007 (0.003) -4.984 (0.433) 0.273 (0.033) 0.076 (0.018) 22846.807 (2032.578) 10.033 (0.088) 0.226 (0.006) 0.259 (0.005) 0.002 (0.000) 0.107 (0.048)
Finland 0.021 (0.001) -3.837 (0.056) 0.462 (0.010) 0.213 (0.009) 39257.144 (1350.605) 10.577 (0.034) 0.252 (0.002) 0.261 (0.014) 0.002 (0.000) 0.076 (0.008)
France 0.019 (0.002) -3.929 (0.094) 0.382 (0.004) 0.146 (0.003) 35822.205 (1475.914) 10.486 (0.041) 0.284 (0.003) 0.261 (0.007) 0.002 (0.000) 0.085 (0.009)
Germany 0.004 (0.000) -5.525 (0.044) 0.515 (0.008) 0.265 (0.009) 39925.940 (2678.832) 10.593 (0.066) 0.205 (0.002) 0.310 (0.005) 0.002 (0.000) 0.071 (0.012)
Hungary 0.023 (0.003) -3.747 (0.142) 0.365 (0.059) 0.136 (0.044) 21298.496 (1512.043) 9.964 (0.072) 0.215 (0.003) 0.241 (0.006) 0.002 (0.000) 0.098 (0.017)
Iceland 0.009 (0.001) -4.710 (0.076) 0.405 (0.038) 0.165 (0.031) 41380.192 (1215.725) 10.630 (0.029) 0.311 (0.003) 0.179 (0.008) 0.002 (0.000) 0.056 (0.024)
Israel 0.011 (0.001) -4.547 (0.090) 0.457 (0.008) 0.209 (0.007) 28872.669 (1899.220) 10.269 (0.065) 0.454 (0.005) 0.160 (0.004) 0.002 (0.000) 0.083 (0.011)
Korea 0.031 (0.002) -3.456 (0.055) 0.353 (0.014) 0.125 (0.010) 29748.950 (1733.041) 10.299 (0.058) 0.227 (0.016) 0.149 (0.009) 0.002 (0.000) 0.035 (0.002)
Luxembourg 0.017 (0.001) -4.050 (0.077) 0.428 (0.020) 0.184 (0.017) 86918.694 (3971.080) 11.372 (0.045) 0.259 (0.008) 0.204 (0.002) 0.002 (0.000) 0.048 (0.005)
Netherlands 0.020 (0.001) -3.902 (0.076) 0.510 (0.015) 0.260 (0.015) 45641.618 (1321.341) 10.728 (0.029) 0.263 (0.003) 0.230 (0.012) 0.002 (0.000) 0.041 (0.008)
New Zealand 0.002 (0.000) -6.368 (0.100) 0.418 (0.004) 0.175 (0.003) 30845.995 (1511.117) 10.336 (0.049) 0.316 (0.001) 0.195 (0.008) 0.002 (0.000) 0.058 (0.014)
Norway 0.010 (0.001) -4.610 (0.054) 0.400 (0.006) 0.160 (0.005) 59776.358 (3956.631) 10.997 (0.066) 0.285 (0.004) 0.226 (0.006) 0.002 (0.000) 0.031 (0.004)
Poland 0.012 (0.001) -4.378 (0.081) 0.325 (0.036) 0.107 (0.025) 20207.247 (2579.601) 9.907 (0.129) 0.215 (0.003) 0.191 (0.003) 0.002 (0.000) 0.092 (0.012)
Portugal 0.012 (0.002) -4.419 (0.128) 0.332 (0.026) 0.111 (0.017) 26558.193 (521.970 ) 10.187 (0.020) 0.230 (0.004) 0.277 (0.010) 0.002 (0.000) 0.113 (0.032)
Slovak Republic 0.034 (0.002) -3.360 (0.076) 0.238 (0.008) 0.057 (0.004) 24142.536 (2038.476) 10.089 (0.086) 0.217 (0.004) 0.173 (0.005) 0.002 (0.000) 0.125 (0.019)
Slovenia 0.022 (0.002) -3.818 (0.092) 0.418 (0.008) 0.175 (0.006) 28351.080 (880.111 ) 10.252 (0.031) 0.203 (0.004) 0.238 (0.006) 0.001 (0.000) 0.067 (0.018)
Spain 0.004 (0.001) -5.658 (0.320) 0.248 (0.013) 0.062 (0.007) 32403.199 (568.189 ) 10.386 (0.017) 0.218 (0.005) 0.247 (0.008) 0.002 (0.000) 0.173 (0.063)
Sweden 0.024 (0.001) -3.686 (0.055) 0.387 (0.010) 0.150 (0.008) 42080.770 (1911.048) 10.646 (0.045) 0.257 (0.003) 0.279 (0.012) 0.002 (0.000) 0.076 (0.011)
Switzerland 0.018 (0.001) -4.013 (0.055) 0.433 (0.015) 0.188 (0.013) 53399.177 (3100.762) 10.884 (0.058) 0.220 (0.007) 0.252 (0.011) 0.002 (0.000) 0.042 (0.006)
Notes: T = 6, n = 25, N = 150Numbers in parentheses stand for the standard deviation.
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Table 3: Descriptive stastistics of OECD panel data: by year
year recipients ratio logit recipients ratio mgincome mgincome 2 gdp capita log gdp capita youth dependency old dependency divorce rate unemployment
Mean
2007 0.016 -4.339 0.396 0.164 35645.300 10.419 0.257 0.221 0.002 0.060
2008 0.015 -4.383 0.391 0.160 37381.672 10.468 0.255 0.223 0.002 0.057
2009 0.016 -4.311 0.397 0.164 36290.570 10.443 0.253 0.226 0.002 0.078
2010 0.017 -4.275 0.400 0.166 37469.973 10.476 0.252 0.230 0.002 0.084
2011 0.016 -4.370 0.399 0.166 39355.518 10.524 0.252 0.234 0.002 0.081
2012 0.016 -4.284 0.398 0.166 40086.599 10.543 0.252 0.240 0.002 0.083
Median
2007 0.016 -4.147 0.400 0.160 36871.534 10.515 0.249 0.229 0.002 0.054
2008 0.014 -4.231 0.400 0.160 38133.413 10.549 0.242 0.234 0.002 0.056
2009 0.015 -4.212 0.400 0.160 37695.802 10.537 0.240 0.237 0.002 0.078
2010 0.015 -4.156 0.400 0.160 38737.069 10.565 0.237 0.239 0.002 0.077
2011 0.015 -4.194 0.420 0.176 40683.337 10.614 0.236 0.240 0.002 0.072
2012 0.016 -4.127 0.420 0.176 40619.937 10.612 0.236 0.248 0.002 0.074
Standard Deviation
2007 0.009 0.775 0.082 0.064 13813.492 0.353 0.054 0.039 0.000 0.024
2008 0.008 0.758 0.084 0.064 14436.887 0.348 0.054 0.040 0.000 0.022
2009 0.009 0.731 0.082 0.065 13382.286 0.336 0.053 0.041 0.000 0.033
2010 0.009 0.728 0.080 0.065 13804.461 0.330 0.053 0.041 0.000 0.040
2011 0.010 0.865 0.084 0.068 14869.727 0.330 0.053 0.041 0.000 0.040
2012 0.009 0.726 0.089 0.071 15019.149 0.329 0.054 0.042 0.000 0.046
Notes: T = 6, n = 25, N = 150.
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Table 4: Results of empirical analysis using OECD panel data
Dependent variable:
logit recipients ratio
Pooling one-way FE two-way FE one-way RE two-way RE
mgincome 15.277∗∗ 18.192∗∗∗ 19.529∗∗∗ 17.301∗∗∗ 18.596∗∗∗
(6.340) (6.297) (6.327) (5.471) (5.537)
mgincome 2 −16.284∗∗ −22.255∗∗∗ −23.934∗∗∗ −20.831∗∗∗ −22.347∗∗∗
(7.509) (8.200) (8.239) (7.116) (7.193)
log gdp capita 0.206 0.553 0.465 0.518 0.490
(0.214) (0.491) (0.739) (0.330) (0.397)
unemployment 2.763 4.845∗∗∗ 5.215∗∗∗ 4.730∗∗∗ 4.951∗∗∗
(2.378) (1.270) (1.476) (1.166) (1.328)
youth dependency −6.583∗∗∗ −5.926 −7.378 −5.629∗∗ −6.458∗∗
(1.458) (4.298) (4.665) (2.570) (2.639)
old dependency −7.790∗∗∗ −6.112∗ −9.749∗ −6.518∗∗ −8.839∗∗∗
(2.059) (3.463) (5.165) (2.688) (3.261)
divorce rate 76.239 240.823 275.167 206.935 250.086
(171.190) (166.441) (170.419) (146.998) (155.897)
Constant −6.789∗∗∗ −11.083∗∗∗ −10.424∗∗
(2.436) (3.619) (4.343)
Observations 150 150 150 150 150
R2 0.163 0.209 0.220 0.196 0.229
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.001 −0.029 0.156 0.161
F -test (vs. pooling) 55.834 ∗∗∗ 46.667∗∗∗
F -test (vs. one-way FE) 1.1348
LM -test (vs. pooling) 17.320∗∗∗ 11.152∗∗∗
Hausman-test (vs. random effect) 0.96729 0.65122
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for standard error calculated by HAC (Arellano,
1987) estimator. Above ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.
23
